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06.23.03

field trip

TOM RICHARD: Chapter Eight: Friedrich Nietzche and Michael Jackson

A friend and I went to the Arkansas Arts Center yesterday afternoon. It had been awhile - maybe six months - since I last went. People don't often suspect that Little Rock has much in the way of art, but you'd be surprised. The Arts Center has expanded exponentially in the past few years as local donations have kicked in, and the three current exhibits are all worth seeing. I wish I knew more about art theory so I could think more critically when I go. Mostly, I just wander around and enjoy myself. I feel a little odd writing about it here, but I want to be able to remember.

The piece above won the 46th Annual Delta Exhibition, which is a juried show open to artists from Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas. The scan above doesn't do it justice, since you aren't able to read all the bits written on it, which include a battle of aphorisms between Nietzche and Michael Jackson. Several professors from UALR were also in the show, as well as a number of Arkansas artists that I've grown up watching. I've been to the Delta Exhibition for the past several years, but this year is the best one that I remember.

The second gallery we walked through featured Edwin Dickinson. He started his career in the teens with wonderful, dark, moody oils (that are apparently impossible to find on the net.) Then he moved on to allegorical pieces and portraits in the thirties and forties, before finally segueing into landscapes, some of which are lovely graphite-on-paper bits, and some of which are very 1950's-American-in-Europe oils. I'm not all that fond of his later work, but those very early oils and their profound shadows - those are the most memorable ones. I sat in front of them until Gina had wandered off several rooms down.

Warren Criswell is a Central Arkansas artist whom I've followed for several years. The first pieces of his that I saw were of dark southern roads, hanging in a gallery in Hot Springs several years ago. I've kept an eye out for shows ever since. I love his work, and don't think I understand it nearly as well as I might. Yesterday, I got fascinated by three little monotypes, especially this one, called Double Indemnity, and this other one, entitled Don Giovanni Impenitente, and Moths. There's something about the suspended figures in each one - they don't look particularly perturbed to be falling or flying. He only had one room for his show, though. I wish it had been bigger.

It was good to just look, since I don't often get a chance to spend a couple of hours being completely visual. And it was a nice change from reading theory. There is some Foucault for today, of course:

The observing gaze refrains from intervening; it is silent and gestureless. Observation leaves things as they are; there is nothing hidden to it in what is given. The correlative of observation is never the invisible, but always the immediately visible, once one has removed the obstacles erected to reason by theories and to the senses by the imagination. (The Birth of the Clinic, 107)

06.22.03

i grow old

When I was a teenager, I devoted countless hours to watching sitcoms. During a commercial break one night, my dad came into the room and sadly watched a particular commercial that had been played over and over all night. When I asked him whatever was the matter, he explained how absolutely wrong it was that a Hendrix song would ever be in a car commercial. I did not completely understand why this would be the case.

Now the chorus from Blitzkrieg Bop is in an AT&T mLife ad. Not my beloved Ramones! Needless to say, I look very sad when I watch these commercials, because such a thing is absolutely wrong. And besides, those lyrics are a horribly ironic choice for a marketing campaign.

06.21.03

there's a science to it

Introduction to Coincidence

06.20.03

so is it important to think?

I'd been wondering what good all this Foucault might do me in the long run, aside from providing theoretical background for The Thesis. Then I ran across this, from So Is It Important to Think?, a 1981 interview with Foucault:

And then, above all, I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation.

A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based.

We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social as the only instance of the real and stop regarding that essential element in human life and human relations - I mean thought - as so much wind. Thought does exist, both beyond and before systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always drives everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits.

Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy.

Understood in those terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly indispensable for any transformation. For a transformation that would remain within the same mode of thought, a transformation that would only be a certain way of better adjusting the same thought to the reality of things, would only be a superficial transformation.

On the other hand, as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible.

06.19.03

comma kitten with a whip


[take the test]

No doubt there'll be some grievous typo in my next entry.
(Via commonplaces.)

06.17.03

masked marketing

Recent Top Secret Communiqués have implied that my generation is aswim in a sea of branding unimagined by preceding generations. Nike-XBox-Britney, oh my.

One can successfully argue that we are aswim in a surge of media heretofore unseen, but I don’t think there are necessarily more brands than before. The mid-century decades were not a less branded time. I think about my conceptions of those decades, and what I see is children playing in the vacant lot in their Converse All-Stars. I think of kids eating boxes of Cheerios so as to send in the box-tops for an Official Lone Ranger Frontiertown Cutout (or, for an additional ten cents, one’s very own Lone Ranger Atomic Bomb Ring). I’m thinking of the whole nuclear family gathering around the radio and early TV: Kraft Television Theater. Colgate Comedy Hour. Coke Time. Bob Hope on The Pepsodent Show. Fibber McGee and Molly, sponsored by Johnson Wax. The Shadow knows… right after this message from Perfect-O-Lite*.

This would have been the first hard-core wave of daily, consistent marketing directed at children. (Hollywood's marketing departments could only hope for weekly trips to the theater, at best.) This new wave of marketing subtly demanded that kids listen to the show, which meant that they would want the toys, which meant that they would pester their parents to buy the sponsor’s products so as to have box tops to send in.

As you might suspect, there's some Foucault that applies to this:

Let me offer a general and tactical reason that seems self-evident: power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. … For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its operation. (Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 86.)
These early product tie-ins created a way for brands to hide right in the open. They presented an insidious power, one that masked itself behind children’s enthusiasm (and one that never underestimated the power of children’s whining.) And they enabled the gentlemen of advertising to create a generation of children who expected such things, who found them right and good, and who in turn spawned my generation. And you're right - we have never known another world.

*And, as far as I know, branded products were all that was available. Generic products didn’t become available until the 70s. I’ve grown up completely saturated with advertising and media, but I’ve also never known a world where there wasn’t some cheaper alternative around.

06.15.03

Happy Father's Day

Hey Daddy! I love you.

Part Two: A Common Banner

The Happy Tutor asks, via email:

Why not ask what it is that we all have in common that might enable us to unite under a common banner for common decency? That used to be called "Universalism," "Glassy Essence," "Human Right," "Nature," "Natural Law." What say you?

In a perfect world, we would all be perceived and treated as equal beings. That equal status would in turn produce a more homogeneous voice of humankind, and at that point it wouldn't matter what race/gender/miscellaneous identity we studied.

This world that exists right now doesn't provide these conditions. We all come from different spaces in society, and therefore have different experiences and different ideas. Perhaps the reason there's not been much uniting under many common banners so far is that people don't understand how alike we really are. If one lives within an insular area or social strata, then opportunities to get to know people who are different from oneself may be limited. College provides the first chance many people have to begin to see outside of themselves. For instance, I was educated primarily in private, religious schools in the South*. From fourth grade until I hit college, I encountered a grand total of one student who was not Caucasian. That's why I think it's so important that disparate voices are represented at all educational levels, but particularly at the university level. Until I got there, my understanding of how other people thought and acted and the issues they faced was minimal, and I had no tools to look outside my own worldview. Reading across widely mixed demographics for the past ten years (as well as mixing in signficantly wider social circles) has given me those tools.

Don't get me wrong: I have no problem with dead white guys. Hell, I have degrees in Dead White Guys, only the University put "Literature" and "Rhetoric" on them instead. I enjoyed getting those, both of which were largely based on knowledge of traditional canons. And I've written before on my feelings about men and exclusionary feminism. I don't think we should toss out the old guard, not by any means. Rather, we should seek to incorporate different voices with theirs. To paraphrase Alice Walker, I had to read Shakespeare and Zora Neale Hurston, Donne and Tsao Hsueh-Chin, Byron and Jim Carroll, Faulkner and Ferlinghetti, before I could begin to feel anything approaching well read at all. Reading all of this taught me that skin and class and country and sexual preference mean so little, that we are essentially all the same**.

Eudora Welty said something about this in a 1973 interview:

I shall always keep my belief that good literature is always about one subject - mankind. We in the South may portray the South, Northern writers may portray the North; indeed, Chinese writers may portray China. But if their works are good, they are really about mankind, everybody everywhere.
Time will not diminish such works. Things like love and hate, justice and injustice, good and bad, truth and lies, they endure, they are still the same, no matter the skin they wear, no matter the year they were written about.***

Studying topic-specific theory accomplishes much the same thing for me that literature does. It teaches me to think critically about the issues that specific groups are facing instead of just buying into the party line about these issues. Studying Queer Theory totally changed my ideas about what queerness is and how it functions within the larger societal structures. Reading Feminist Theory has also changed how I think about feminism, and taught me that there's no way I can align myself with most feminist theorists currently out there. Had I not studied these things, I would never have really known.

My point is this: If we continue to read and teach the same things we always have, then we'll continue to be the same people we've always been. A continuation of the traditional canon doesn't leave enough room for advancement toward something greater than we already are. We do need a common banner and a common decency, and reading each other is one of the things that might help get us there.

*Lordy, I don't think it gets much more insular than a Southern Baptist school in 1988. But you know, I don't think this insularity is by any means limited to the South.
**Incidentally, reading blogs does much the same thing for me. It opens up daily lives in worlds I would never have had access to otherwise. Every day, I get to learn more about what it's like to be a professor-priest-dad in Chicago, a gay expat in Sweden, a British mom living in Belgium, or a married coding queen in Wisconsin.
***Conversations with Eudora Welty, 153.
****Foucault (heh!) might suggest that women's, queer and ethnic studies are absolutely essential because anything less provides a lopsided picture of power relations. I think that anything less provides a lopsided picture of human relations.

06.14.03

unaccessorized

What do I wear in bed? Why, Arete, of course.

The Happy Tutor responds:

But doesn't the performance of desire require the appropriate props? What better definition of a Brand than "the performance of desire" ("Just Do It!") ... Where other Doms have bags stuffed with thousands of dollars of cuffs, gags, masks, clamps, chaps, and whips, I still do business the old fashioned way, in an old white shirt, tasteful gold vest left over from my high school prom, and my own bare hands.

Like my post said, consumerism is all about choices. One can choose props or eschew them. We here at this blog choose to perform desire while wearing only a few drops of Arete perfume.

btw

Yesterday's post has been updated.

06.13.03

up on big brushy

June 7, 2003

As you might imagine, Big Brushy is located not far from Blowout Mountain, and several other aptly named spots whose names I did not write down and have thus forgotten.

Update: I also forgot that we decided that Sappho Sundays should now be hosted at Big Brushy. The irony would be too good.

And lastly: though there have been no Bigfoot sightings in the Ouachita Forest to date, one can sometimes spot the elusive and very camera-shy Mister Boyfriend.

That was evil of me, wasn't it? But I blame him. I have no actual pictures of the man. I figure that if I keep taking one crappy picture of him on every trip we take to Oklahoma, then eventually I will assemble a collage. So far, my portraits include the immortal "Mister Boyfriend, Hand," (seen above) and "Mister Boyfriend, Three-Quarter Rear View." The resultant installation will be entitled "Mister Boyfriend, Assembled in Oklahoma."

possibly PoMo

It's interesting, this business of being categorized as a Postmodernist. I've never really thought of myself as one, but I guess that if we throw it against the wall it'll stick. Essentially, though, I'm a student. I got curious and looked that word up, and it comes from the Latin studens, which is related to studere, to study. Therefore, that would be my job: to study. (I knew that already.) When one studies, one needs tools to understand things with. This is what theory does for me - it provides tools to take things apart.

All I care is that the tool works. I don't care if it's fashionable, just that it's functional. If plain old Structuralism worked for me, then I'd use it. The more I study Postmodernism, the more I see how I can apply to it to the world at large. More and more, I find that it works for me now, at this place and this time. Of course it has flaws, as everything man-made does. When it doesn't hold up, it's time to reach for a different tool in the toolbox. There's no point in using a hammer when what's really needed is a drill. Still, PoMo theory works for me far more often than it doesn't - and certainly more often than anything else does. (Your mileage may vary.)

The other reason I study Postmodernism is that there are things that a successful graduate student is expected to know - in this case, the dominant theories of the field. It's the rules. Besides, one needs to know the lay of the land in order to successfully navigate it. I didn't suggest a Foucault seminar because I'm working for the canonization of Saint Foucault*. I wanted to take a course in this stuff because I need to know about it. It's a requirement of the profession. My thesis has to do with Intellectual Property, and there's no way that any department would let me defend a thesis on that topic that didn't discuss Foucauldian power issues. There are some things that are simply expected, and thusly must be done.

So yeah, I guess I'm PoMo, although never in the most conventional sense of the term. (Stereotypical views of Postmodernism abound. And some of them are funny.) I have no patience for the bleakness of Sartre. I'm not an atheist or an agnostic. I can't help but believe that there has to be a center somewhere, and that it does hold. But bleakness isn't the essence of Postmodernism for me, not by a long shot. What Postmodernism does for me is provide a reminder that we can never stop questioning, that we can't accept things at face value. That seems like quite a worthwhile thing, given the line of work I'm in.


* Actually, what I asked for was a sixteen-week course in the Structuralist Gang of Four, which would have covered Barthes, Lacan, Foucault and Levi-Strauss**. What I got was five weeks of Foucault, and I'm happy to have it.
** Yes, I know that Foucault railed against being categorized as a Structuralist. And in many ways, he was right to do so. But that's not the issue here.

06.12.03

conclusion

Apology accepted.

queer as accessory?

My comments have been graced by the Happy Tutor! He had quite a lot to say, but I was most interested in this, which comes from both comments and private email:

Sadly, I am afraid that Queer, Bi, Trans, and S/M and Bondage are marketing categories. As an exercise, cruise about the net and compile the cost of an ideal weekend, with appropriate venue and props for each sexual peccadillo.
The gay lifestyle, the lifestyle of the rich and famous, the lifestyle of the bookish, bondage as a lifestyle. What does this amount to other than a consumer identity? A way of life into which goods and services are sold as props and accessories? To think of it as a site of resistance seems 30 years out of date. Tell me about your lifestyle, and I will send you to the right department in our store. […]
Why not ask what it is that we all have in common that might enable us to unite under a common banner for common decency? That used to be called "Universalism," "Glassy Essence," "Human Right," "Nature," "Natural law." What say you?

I don't pretend to have anywhere near the amount of knowledge the Tutor does on the topics of marketing and consumerism. I haven't devoted the time or work to understanding it that he has, and my reading on these subjects is peripheral. But I do have some background in queer theory and queer life, and I'd like to respond from that angle. This will be a two-parter, for reasons of both space and time. Here we go:

The First Part: Queer-As-Marketing-Demographic
It's easy to see how someone might conclude that queerness is all about the accessories. And it can be - the same way that anything at all can, assuming one buys into the trappings. The individual is always free to determine his or her own level of consumerism. For instance, I suppose I could be called "bookish." But my books are paperbacks (some new, some secondhand), and my bookshelves are mostly scavenged from my parents' house. There are precious few hardbacks around here, and no leatherbound editions, no carved oak bookcases. I would rather put my money into my mind by purchasing more material to read. I could spend even less by using boards and cinderblocks and going to the library, but paperbacks and secondhand bookcases are where my level of comfort lies. Likewise, I've never felt the need to literally buy into queer culture. The only queer accessory I ever remember purchasing was a t-shirt with a tiny pride logo on it. I bought it because when I waitressed in it at the queer-owned restaurant where I worked, my tips went up. It was a purchase born purely of capitalist greed, or of blue-collar necessity. Whichever. I've always been of the opinion that I am fundamentally a person, regardless of gender or sexuality, and therefore I wear people-clothes and do people-things. I'm a bit anti-social, and like Groucho Marx, am suspicious of any group that would have me as a member. It's just the way I am.

At the other end of the spectrum are the folks I call hobby-queers. These are the people who find being queer fascinating, and who dedicate themselves to it. Most of them (although not all) seem to feel that they need a certain number of accessories in order to effectively "live the life." Those would be the ones who festoon their cars with rainbow paraphernalia and make annual reservations for Gay Days, where they tote their copies of Out and deluxe edition Queer as Folk DVDs in their official pink triangle bags. Ain't nothing wrong with that, but it never did appeal to me.

It's true that some forms of queerness require accessories by sheer definition. Being a transvestite can be accessory-heavy or not, depending on your level of commitment. If you're passing every day, then you only need one set of clothes. If you're a more occasional trannie, then you'll need two wardrobes. But the transvestite consumer still gets to decide how much money s/he is willing to invest in these wardrobes. The transsexual, though, is required to purchase the ultimate expensive accessory - a new set of nether regions does set one back a hefty (and non-negotiable) sum.

Last categories: B/D and S/M. Again, it depends on the consumer - some folks visit the hardware store, some visit the local Pleasure Chest. I got out of this one easy, since the practices don't really appeal to me, but I can't help but observe that people do tend to want to upgrade in their hobbies (and to want the right tool for the job.) For instance: do you feel that Blogger is adequate to your needs, or are you running MT on your very own domain?

You're right, there's a lot of money to be made here, and queerness does present a very easily targeted demographic. But queers get to choose as much as any other demographic whether or not they will spend that money. And they're no more of a target than straight couples are for Sears or Martha Stewart or Carnival Cruise Lines or Victoria's Secret. We're all easily slotted into target groups, and we're all surrounded by constant consumer coercion. We all have a consumer identity imposed upon us. It's a matter of choosing whether or not to participate. I would even venture that the assumption that queer identities are equivalent to consumer identities means that one has bought into the marketing hype of the "perfect" queer couple, who really don't differ all that much from the perfect straight couple in their consumption of houses, declarative t-shirts, sexual accessories, special-interest magazines and vacations.

The only thing really necessary to sexual identity, whether queer or straight (or to an "ideal weekend of sexual peccadilloes," for that matter), is desire. Whether that desire is for a particular sort of body or for a mind and soul depends on the individual and the situation. No relationship is inherently a "site of resistance," unless the participants make it so. (A lot of queer theorists would take issue with that statement by saying that any non-normative relationship existing within a hegemonic culture is inherently a site of resistance. I don't care, because that doesn't reflect my reality at all.)

Desire also partially accounts for the fragmentation within the queer community, which presents one of the difficulties of directing marketing toward any notion of a stereotypically queer couple. Just because the demographic is easily targeted doesn't mean it's valid. For instance, it's dangerous to say that your market is "lesbians." Would those be stone butches, leather dykes, soft butches, sort-of-femmes, lipstick lesbians, granola lesbians, or just womyn who love womyn? Folks do tend to sort themselves into these categories. A leather dyke and a granola lesbian most likely (but not always) will differ wildly in their purchases of vehicles, music, clothing, food, drink and vacations. The straight perception of queer "community" is a mirage of social proximity, but the reality is wildly different. A proximate social space is created when the queers unite for common cause, and this is the image most often presented by the media. What isn't presented is the fact that that space is wildly splintered. Since we're having a PoMo moment around here lately, I'll end by pointing to Bourdieu's assertion that

the very validity of classification risks encouraging a perception of theoretical classes, which are fictitious regroupings existing only on paper, through an intellectual decision by the researcher, as real classes, real groups, that are constituted as such in reality. The danger is all the greater as the research makes it appear that the divisions drawn in Distinction do indeed correspond to real differences in the most different, and even the more unexpected, domains of practice. (from Social Space and Symbolic Space)

There is no way that you could look at me, my car, my living space or my blog and be able to deduce what my preferences are. I have made a conscious choice not to participate in that brand of consumerism. Accessories don't constitute identity. Desire, and the performance of that desire, does.

06.10.03

beany and cecil

Apparently, I was born just in time to miss out on Beany and Cecil. Good thing I have people around to educate me about such vital topics.

I couldn't resist two more:

Cecil meets the Batniks
Cecil as Scholar

comprehension

I never understood complaints from other women about their horrendous PMS and the attendant mood swings. All I ever got were some cramps. But since I've been back on The Pill for the past six months, I've come to understand with a vengeance. Yesterday's weather alternated between bouts of towering rage and bouts of normalcy, both for no appreciable reason. Fortunately, I was able entertain myself with intermittent bursts of flatulence, which also seem to be a related symptom. It's nice that there's some compensation.

06.08.03

a brief rebuttal

Frank Paynter thinks I'm culturally incompetent. So be it.

He wonders why courses like the current Foucault Reading Seminar and last fall's Queer Theory course (Language, Culture and the Queer Identity) are allowed to clutter up the academic landscape. I have only a brief response to his post, since I'm afraid we'll just have to agree to disagree on this matter.

1. Yes, both of these classes are graduate-credit courses at a fully accredited university.

2. You're right, there shouldn't be a need for women's studies, or ethnic studies, or queer studies. But until courses with more general themes stop ignoring the full spectrum of history, and until I can discuss these issues in a non-culturally-centered class as easily and fully as I can in special-topic classes, I'm going to keep on taking topic-related courses.

3. Even if there shouldn't be a need for these classes, there will always be a place for them. I am a Rhetoric student with an interest in Gender Studies. My taking a class like Queer Theory is no different than a History student taking a course in Colonial Latin America or Early Modern Europe. It's simply an opportunity to further explore a specific area with students who share an interest. It is not a symptom of any greater ills in the academic system.

4. I suspect that nothing I say here will convince you of the validity of postmodern theory, just as I won't be convinced to abandon it. You're entitled to your opinion, and I'm entitled to mine.

5. Since I do study postmodern theory, I'm happy to be in the Foucault seminar. And since one of the overriding themes of his work is the way that we categorize people, discourse and knowledge and then interlink those categories, it's only natural that queer and gender issues enter the discussion.

Thank you and good night.

home again

We made it back yesterday evening, after a lovely afternoon drive through the Ouachitas on Hwy 271. Pictures later in the week. For now, I've got to get caught up on my Foucault for Monday's class.

06.06.03

gone again

West Highlands, headed toward the Nevis Range and Fort William, March 2000

Just a little overnight stay in Oklahoma. Back tomorrow.

The Repressive Hypothesis

We spent some time in Queer Theory talking about the place of talk shows in modern discourse, trying to decide when the Confessional becomes the Sideshow. I brought this up again Wednesday night when we were discussing The Repressive Hypothesis, and we tossed it around for a while. We discussed the scripted fakery of shows like Jerry Springer, and Jeff compared it to Roland Barthes’ essay on wrestling, which presents the wrestling match as a morality play of sorts, a re-enactment of justice. I don’t think that talk shows are really any more fake than some of the old sideshows, though – I mean, the Alligator Girl went home and washed off her dyed cornflake scales just as often as the Bearded Lady went home and trimmed her real beard.

What I did start to think about, as a way to relate all this with the essay at hand, is that confessionals, talk shows and freak shows are all about codification. Maybe this is what the repressive hypothesis is all about – we want to know what category to put you in so as to then know what your place is within greater society, and how you will be handled. The normative, generative couple occupies a different space and function than does the normal-but-not-legitimate queer couple, who in turn are assigned a different space than the solitary leather queen. People don’t know what to do with, say, a lesbian who enters a committed, long-term relationship with a man. (Although perhaps “hasbian” is becoming a more legit codification these days.) In much the same way, someone who clearly fits a racial profile occupies a different space than a mulatto. (Except the Old New Orleans quadroons and octaroons, who occupied a space all their own.)

The notion of repressive codification seems to fit in with Foucault’s fascination with genealogies and archaeologies of knowledge, with assigning things to their place within an interlocking grid. The constant incitement to discourse regarding sexual matters helps with that placement.

Added bonus: Foucault and Porn!

subversive discourse

We've been starting out every seminar session with 15 minutes of writing. This is what I scribbled on Wednesday night:

But for decades now, we have found it difficult to speak on the subject without striking a different pose: we are conscious of defying established power, our tone of voice shows that we know we are being subversive, and we ardently conjure away the present and appeal to the future, whose day will be hastened by the contribution we believe we’re making. Something that smacks of revolt, of promised freedom, of the coming age of a different law, slips easily into this discourse on sexual oppression. Some of the ancient functions of prophecy are reactivated therein. Tomorrow sex will be good again. (295)

So here, in We “Other Victorians", Foucault is saying that whenever we talk about sex, we can’t help but sound defiant. How does this interface with the notions of power described in The Repressive Hypothesis, which claims that we are constantly encouraged to talk about sex by the surrounding power/culture? Foucault suggests that we’ve been talking and talking, that this huge socio/political structure has been created that demands constant discourse regarding sexuality; when, then, does that speech become defiant? Is it when we step outside the confessional? Is it when we abandon the prescribed discourse and begin to examine so-called non-normative sexuality (sodomy, sadism, pediatric sexuality)? Is the inherent subversive tone born of a brand of silence? Is it a brand of silence itself? (“We must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things […] There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses. (309 – 310)) Beats me.

06.05.03

you people

A couple of you have written comments in the past few days that you felt were too long, and so you sent them as emails or just plain deleted them. (You know who you are, oh yes you do.)

People: at my blog, there's no such thing as a too-long comment. Write all you want. You are all wonderful, smart, funny individuals, and I want to know what it is that you have to say, OK?

dinner

"[…] I think that in order to really care about food, you have to have experienced depression, or at least great difficulties. This is not to say that everyone who's depressed is a gourmet, of course. But most of the people I know who really, sincerely happy most of the time are also profoundly uninterested in food. Food for them is just fuel to get them through the next day at the beach. Whereas people who've experienced great pain, either self-inflicted or not, sometimes come to the preparation and eating of great food as both a comfort and an affirmation of life, sometimes much needed and hard to find. Or then again, maybe everybody's fucking miserable, and some of them also like to eat."

You know, I hadn't thought about it all that much before, but I think Julie's got a point. I've cooked since I was old enough to stand on a step stool and boil water for Jello, but I didn't start to get really interested in it until my late teens, when I entered a rather deep depression that lasted several years. Right about the same time it started, I developed an obsession with fresh produce, with the right way to fry chicken, and with teaching myself to bake. (Never did make extraordinary progress with that last one, but I can make a mean apple galette.) It was a way to hold on to life in the middle of a chemical sea whose tides had gone wonky. A friend of mine mentioned the same thing a while back - during one of the worst periods of his life, he taught himself to bake bread, and stacked brioches all over the place as a way to hang on.

I've never let go of cooking, even though the depression has long since receeded. It's what I do on the weekends to relax and to remind myself that I'm alive. It's what I do when I'm happy, and when I'm sad. When I want to connect with other people, I cook for them and with them. I'm always thinking about what to get at the store, what's in season, what to make tonight and the next night. I can't imagine not living this way, which is why I'm never comfortable around people who claim, "Oh, food is just fuel for me. I never think about it." I don't know what to say to that, or to anyone who would think such a thing. I would never weed my friends along such criteria, but I can't think of anyone close to me who has this attitude - probably because I keep feeding them all too much for them to think that way.

inventory

I used to garden quite a bit, but gave it up when I went back to school full time four years ago. Every year I swore I'd make time again, and every year the plot produced a bounteous harvest of weeds.

Now the promise of a new apartment has brought on a flurry of container gardening. Maybe too much of a flurry. It started out as strictly kitchen herbs, but thus far I have potted:

16 basil plants, tightly packed into two pots (Pesto!)
1 pot of rosemary
1 of cilantro
1 poblano pepper
2 ornamental peppers
2 midget spruces
1 aloe
1 pot of chives
1 pretty purple-flowered thingie (because Angel Mist is such a crappy cheesy name and I haven't figured out the proper nomenclature yet)

All of this for a patio about the size of a bedspread. (OK, plus a front stoop.) I really must stop. Just like I tell myself everytime I cross the threshold of Home Depot.

06.02.03

Authorship and Intellectual Property

We're also covering What Is An Author? this evening. I used it briefly in a paper on Creative Commons, and am still very interested in the implications different notions of authorship pose to Intellectual Property. Here's what I have so far, which is a blend of Foucault's What Is An Author? and Barthes' Death of the Author:

[...] If we reveal ourselves on the web and draw readers through ethos and persona, haven’t we attempted a resurrection of the Author?

Not necessarily. Regardless of medium, and regardless of the extent to which we reveal ourselves, we’re still engaged in the act of writing. That act puts our existence squarely within language, which is Barthes’ point: “It is the language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a prerequisite impersonality … to reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’” (143). My readers know the words on the screen, not me. Anything they might know of me is “born simultaneously with the text” (Barthes 145). Thus the words live and breathe on their own, and exist within the space and time that the reader devotes to them.

The blogger, and the author, serves as a conduit that allows the words to be born – a function, as Foucault would have it. Like Barthes, he defines “author” as a concept devoid of persona:

Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. As a result, the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his absence… To imagine writing as absence seems to be a simple repetition, in transcendental terms, of both the religious principle of inalterable and yet never fulfilled tradition, and the aesthetic principle of the work’s survival, its perpetuation beyond the author’s death…” (102-105, emphasis mine)

Whether that death is metaphorical or physical is of little consequence – either way, the issue is the perpetuation of the work itself. (Or, as Lanham would call it, the potential of the text.) Viewed in this manner, the words belong to themselves, independent of their creator, just as knowledge belongs to itself. Any potential the text has belongs to the reader. Barthes writes, “To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. … refusing to assign a ‘secret,’ an ultimate meaning to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary…” (147). This directly coincides with our discussion of shared knowledge on the web.

Perhaps most important to the topic of Creative Commons is Foucault’s concept of the author as transdiscursive. He sees the author as not only the creator of his/her own work, but also as the producer of other works: “They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other text” (114). Authorship produces not only concrete original work, but also the possibility of additional derivative work.

Truth and Power: Excerpts

These are excerpts that I want to revisit later, since I'm convinced they apply to Intellectual Property issues that I'm interested in. Everything is from Rabinow's The Foucault Reader.

But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power; one identifies power with a law that says no; power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition. Now I believe that this is a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, one which has been curiously widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (61)
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with sayng what counts as true. In societies like ours, the "political economy" of truth is characterized by five important traits. "Truth" is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ("ideological" struggles). (73)
"Truth" is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. "Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it. A "regime" of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it's this same regime which, subject to certain modifications, operates in the socialist countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). (74)

Synopsis: What Is Enlightenment?

Since we're proceeding along with the first batch of readings for the Foucault Seminar, I thought I'd post my notes here. As this is my first time through many of these essays, it'll most likely be a hodge-podge of synopses and attempts to pilfer bits that apply to Intellectual Property rather than any Deep Thoughts on my part. I'm feeling a little guilty about not attempting closer readings of these, but I suppose the nature of a five-week reading seminar is to encourage participants to just plow on through. My goal is to cover as much ground as possible and find the parts that apply to my current project, and then revisit those in the last half of summer.

My synopses are always very short. I guess it comes from old journalism training and the notion that if you can't reduce your concept to 25 words or less, then you must not understand it. I wouldn't dare try to reduce Foucault's grocery list to 25 words, but I still have the notion that brief summaries suggest at least a decent general understanding. Maybe, maybe not - but it is my way.

The first text is What Is Enlightenment?. It has four primary sections:
1. Reflection on Kant's Was is Aufklarung
2. Reflection on Baudelaire as exemplar of the proper attitude of modernity
3. Investigation of whether The Enlightenment and Humanism are equivalent (he concludes that they aren't: "tension, not identity")
4. Practical applications and method

The overarching message is:
Enlightenment is all about attitude. We must, as 1 - 3 suggest, assume the appropriate attitude in order to construct a "historical ontology of ourselves" and thus venture toward a state of Enlightenment. This attitude demands gonzo engagement rather than passive absorption. (Baudelaire: we must eat and be eaten by knowledge, be drunken always, etc.)
We are the subjects of study via our discourse and actions. These must be systematically studied, especially with regard to (inter)connections with the axes of knowledge, power and ethics. Attention must be given to both general and specific elements. (Hence Foucault's topics of "Birth of the Clinic" (specific) vs "The Order of Things" or "Archaeology of Knowledge" (general)).
We must perform and embrace a "labor of diverse inquiries." As Kant wrote in the piece referenced here, "Have courage to use your own reason!"

It also includes interesting implications about reason and freedom, and I'm still working on understanding those.

A bit-by-bit outline of the essay is here. A deeper reading by one of my classmates is here.