Final Ethics Response: Pragma-dialectical
This is my final response for Ethics class, which ends next week. I respond to a question about Christopher Tindale‛s chapter entitled "... And Rhetoric as Argument" from Rhetorical Argumentation: Principles of Theory and Practice and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst‛s essay "From Analysis to Presentation: A Pragma-dialectical Approach to Writing Argumentative Texts." Tindale argues that rhetorical figures ("devices that use words to make some striking effects on an audience") are arguments unto themselves rather than mere facilitators of arguments; VE & G focus on establishing a pragma-dialectical approach to revision. My fellow grad student Zoë Nyssa is using both articles in a rhetorical analysis of the controversy surrounding wild rice research at UMN.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that "Generally, the comprehensibility and acceptability of argumentative texts can be diminished in four ways: first, by redundancy; second, by implicitness; third, by disarrangement; and fourth, by lack of clarity." Does Tindale agree? Could a case be made a la Tindale that, for example, redundancy is actually rhetoric functioning as argument?
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are adamant in their negative assessment of these four elements. Indeed, their transformational approach is designed to expressly discourage these elements presence. Tindale's chapter seems quite at odds with most of these assessments, although I do not believe that he would reject all of them.
Before beginning, though, it's important to note a fundamental difference in these two essays. VE & G are considering arrangement within the macro structure of an entire argument (their example is a letter). Tindale is examining micro elements mostly by themselves or in small sections of a larger piece (his longest example is two paragraphs from a much longer essay). They're both looking at how elements of argumentation work, but not necessarily in the same way. To employ the architecture metaphor: Tindale is looking at whether or not a window is also a door, and concludes that one can in fact go in and out the window. Meanwhile, VE&G want to build a system for revising the architect's plans. Both ultimately investigate how to build the most functional structure, but they're going about it in very different ways and with rather different immediate goals. [Was my metaphor also an argument? I hope so.]
Having noted that, I will consider each "diminishing" element put forth by VE & G, contrasting it with relevant elements from Tindale.
VE & G Claim #1: Redundancy is bad and can be cured through the analytic transformation of deletion, which consists of "leaving out all elements which are not immediately relevant to resolving the difference of opinion, such as repetitions, digressions, asides, clarifications, and anecdotes" (2)
Tindale notes that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca pay particular attention to repetition and amplification as effective rhetorical figures (68). Later, he discusses Fahnestock's contention that arguments are tidal, "ebbing and surging, now at a 'lower' point of restatement or elaboration and now at a 'higher' point of succinct and epitomizing summation" (70). (Note the use of the term 'restatement'.) Restatement is also essential to the figures amplification, incrementum, and gradation (71-72). Gradatio in particular relies on overlapping terms to build the verbal and visual force of an argument and is particularly effective in causal reasoning.
Fahnestock also describes the rhetorical effect of ploche (repeating a word or its variation) and polyptoton (repeating a word in different grammatical cases) (72). Both are time-honored uses of repetition. All of these figures constitute effective forms of redundancy.
VE & G Claim #2: Implicitness is also to be avoided. It can be solved through addition, in which "elements are added which left implicit but which were immediately relevant to the resolution of the difference of opinion, such as unexpressed arguments, standpoints, or any other unexpressed elements" (2).
Tindale might counter with a discussion of allusion, the figure in which "something is evoked without being expressly named" in order to create intimacy between speaker and audience. He argues that "... ways to establish such connections that make audiences more inclined to accept premises are essential. Allusion also has ethotic import insofar as such connections increase the audience's appreciation of the arguer" (68-69). One cannot discount the effect of communion created through the mutually understood yet unspoken element.
VE & G Claim #3: Disarrangement is not to be tolerated, and is solvable through permutation. Permutation "amounts to a (re)arrangement of elements � The various steps are clearly distinguished, overlapping steps are separated, and anticipatory or retrogradatory steps are reordered" (2).
Tindale might agree with this claim, and might further substantiate it through Grices Cooperative Principle, which suggests that some standards of order must exist in order to achieve communication. Two figures which rely on arrangement are antimetabole, the reversal of pairs (60, 70-71), and antithesis, which sets contrasting or opposing terms in parallel or balanced coda or phrases (70). Gradation is also dependent on specific, connected arrangement of terms that build upon each other.
VE & G Claim #4: Lack of clarity is a cardinal sin and must be remedied by substitution. One replaces unclear formulations with "formulations which indivate the function unequivocally" and in a parallel fashion (2).
If we observe this rule, then we necessarily eliminate the use of allegory, irony, praeteriotio, onomatopoeia, and apostrophe. Tindale notes Reboul's claim that "double meaning has argumentative value" (64) and further suggests that double meanings "foster commonality" between the speaker and audience. (Don't in -jokes give all of us an inclusive feeling when we understand them?)
Praeteritio and apostrophe are two figures that derive their effectiveness largely from ostensible lack of clarity. Praeteritio is "the claim that the speaker will not repeat things ... followed by the mention of what will not be repeated, effectively doing the very thing that he claims not to do" (60). Apostrophe involves addressing an audience other than the actual one before you - ancestors, in Tindale's example, or the perhaps the gods. Both are traditional and are situationally effective as long as the Cooperative Principle is observed.
So it seems that Tindale might reject three out of these four claims. However, I feels it's once again important to point out that these authors are not examining the same exact elements of argument, and therefore their arguments cannot necessarily be construed as refuting each other. What I have done here is compared micro to macro, strategies for parts of arguments to strategies for entire arguments. They are not necessarily as exclusionary as my comparison suggests. For instance, Tindale recounts the tale of Socrates' refusal to employ the ad misericordium argument, which had the rhetorical effect of parading his family before the court without ever physically doing so. This classic example of praeteritio has the double effect of maintaining Socrates' sense of integrity while also garnering sympathy (and running the risk of alienating jurors who employed ad misericordium in their own trials.) It's a crafty rhetorical move that clarifies several things at once rather than creating confusion. Clearly, praeteritio is not oppositional to clarity in this instance, and I don't think any of the authors would claim it is within the context of Socrates' larger argument.

Comments
You have gone over the edge with this one. You are lost to the world of academia. May God have mercy on us all.
Posted by: j | December 8, 2004 6:09 PM
I know, I know. My job requires me to write this way sometimes, but it doesn't mean that I do this all the time. Just the other day, I watched Malibu's Most Wanted, which definitely qualifies as one of my Top 10 Stupidest Movies of All Time.
Posted by: Krista | December 8, 2004 9:07 PM