I read the assigned sections of the Rhetoric today like a good grad student, but then Mister Boyfriend distracted me by suggesting I take a break with the Physiognomonics. I think it proves that the money he spent on the Revised Oxford Complete Works of Aristotle a while back was justified. From 1.6, a "selection of signs with regard to men is as follows":

• Buttocks pointed and bony are a mark of a strong character, fat fleshy buttocks of a soft character, whilst lean buttocks which look as if they had been rubbed bare, are indicative of a mischievous disposition, as in apes.
• A loose build round about the belly indicates strength of character, as in the male sex, whilst the opposite is by congruity indicative of a soft character. [Yay! I have strength of character!]
• Suppleness of the clavicles signifies quickness of perception, for when the collar-bone is supple, stimulation of the senses is rendered easy. Contrariwise, a stiff collar-bone indicates dullness of sense, because then it is difficult to apprehend sense-stimuli.
• A large head means quickness and a small head dullness of sense, on the evidence of the dog and the ass respectively. A peaked head means impudence, as in those birds which have curved claws.
• As to the eyes, when the lower lids are pendulous and baggy, you may know a bibulous fellow, for heavy drinking produces bagginess below the eyes; but when the upper lids are baggy and hang over the eyes, that signifies somnolence, for on first waking from sleep our upper lids hang heavily. Small eyes mean a small soul, by congruity and on the evidence of the ape: large eyes, lethargy, as in cattle. In a man of good natural parts, therefore, the eyes will be neither large nor small. Hollow eyes mean villainy, as in the ape: protruding eyes, imbecility, by congruity and as in the ass. The eyes, therefore, must neither recede nor protude: an intermediate position is best. When the eyes are slightly deep-set, they signify a proud soul, as in lions, and when a little deeper still, gentleness, as in cattle.
• Men with small ears have the disposition of monkeys, those with large ears the disposition of asses, and you may notice that the best breeds of dogs have ears of moderate size.

Posted at 3:39 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

This is a short assignment that I wrote for my Theory of Rhetoric class about a month ago. I read it again today and decided that I kinda like it, and thought I'd put it up here. In it, I apply elements of classical epideictic rhetoric (specifically, those outlined in Chapter Three of Poulakos and Poulakos' Classical Rhetorical Theory) to the text of Hedwig and the Angry Inch. The full title is "More Than Display: Hedwig and The Angry Inch as Epideictic Rhetoric."

John Cameron Mitchell’s character of Hedwig Robinson presents an interesting rhetor: a German man who becomes an American woman and creates discourse about the transgender condition in the form of rock songs. One might think that such a nontraditional voice might produce highly nontraditional rhetoric – and some might argue such is indeed the case in both the stage and film versions of Hedwig and the Angry Inch.

I will argue instead that Hedwig and the “anatomically incorrect rock odyssey” she inhabits constitute very traditional rhetoric, as the elements of Hedwig’s tale closely resemble the classical epideictic form. At first glance, the performance of either drag or rock and roll might seem at odds with any classical definition. Both are commonly – and incorrectly - viewed as products of the twentieth century. In fact, they have their roots in much older traditions: rock traces its heritage back to Southern African-American music, and drag has been with us since the advent of clothing. Still, this hardly places them within a classical context. The fact that they display the characteristics of epideictic rhetoric as delineated by Poulakos and Poulakos in Chapter Three of Classical Rhetoric Theory does firmly place them in the classical realm. The authors note four characteristics of the epideictic form:
• the affinity for competition
• its propensity to become a spectacle
• its proclivity to excess and exaggeration and
• its susceptibility to the propagation of dominant values (63 – 64).
I will apply each of these elements to the artifact in the paragraphs that follow.

Continue reading "more than display" »

Posted at 11:37 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

These are just a few excerpts from Small Pieces Loosely Joined that I wanted to preserve here for my research purposes.

BODIES AND THE WEB:
“Our idea of knowledge, however, has consistently moved away from the truths of the body. Knowledge, our tradition of thought tells us, is universal, dispassionate, eternal and objective – exactly what bodies are not. The truths of the body are even taken to be the enemies of knowledge. This basic stance comes with the Greek origins of knowledge: we need the discipline of knowledge because bodily perception can be misleading. Knowing has ever since struck us as a pursuit for ascetics, virgin professors, and nerds uncomfortable in their own skins. Knowing, we’ve come to believe, is the type of things that a machine – a computer, or a robot – might do. And it is no accident that the voices of authority that try to shut us up – whether a bad government, a bad teacher, or a bad boss – do so by implicitly claiming to be ‘realistic,’ a code word for the claim that the authority sees the world more ‘objectively’ and without the ‘distortions’ of perspective and interest.
“It would be ironic, then, if the Web, a world our bodies cannot enter, were to return knowledge to the truths of the body: tied to an individual, oriented by a particular viewpoint, rooted in passion (139).”

COMP AND THE WEB:
“Nevertheless, the Web’s character comes from text, and that’s not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Words build the place in which the other forms of media are embedded. Words are the stuff of the Web.
“Words impart their nature to the Web. Although words are pineal, they aren’t mainly physical and ‘merely’ meaningful. Quite the contrary. They can be words only because they are units of meaning … Words have always built worlds, just as they build the Web (164).”. More on page 165 that is too long to type.

MISC.
“On the Web, there’s only passion, words, and the presence of others, in grand, shifting, ineffably messy relationships. … The virtual world of the Web exposes more clearly the truth of our everyday lives (171).”

Posted at 9:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

From Small Pieces Loosely Joined, by the illustrious Mr. Weinberger :

“But the modern concept of knowledge surfaced in Athens, a city of talkers. In the hubbub of voices heard in every market and on every corner, some were saying true things and others were lying, mistaken or fooling themselves … The Greeks needed to decide who to listen to, who was expressing the hidden truth of the situation, for their government was run by the power of speaking … and of listening. …

“Knowing means more than being right. Plato nailed it when he defined knowledge as ‘justified true belief’” (129).

I wasn’t thinking much about Social Constructionism when I was reading Classical Rhetorical Theory, but I am now. Between watching my web-based classes develop and having a professor who’s in the final throes of a dissertation that relies heavily on these theories, I can’t not be thinking about it these days.

“The Web also returns knowledge to its roots in heated arguments in the passageways of Athens. Knowledge isn’t a body of truths stamped with a seal of justification. Knowledge on the Web is a social activity. It is what happens when people say things that matter to them, others reply, and a conversation ensues. Unless the conversation is nothing but a set of insults, each person does the human thing of stating why she thinks she’s right. That’s justification. But the justification may not be canonical” (140).

Obviously, blogging (among other things) is what happens when “people say things that matter to them, others reply, and a conversation ensues.” Blogging can indeed be related to the social structure that fostered Symposium and the sophistic texts. And somebody else thinks so too, which is always reassuring.

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I promised myself that this blog would never be about war, impending or otherwise. I promised myself that it would never be about politics at all, ever. (Sort of a silly promise for a feminist who’s into queer theory, but never you mind that.) Then I got into both of those things with that post on Winesburg. And now that I’m reading about the Sophistic notion of opinion vs. knowledge, I’m about to go there again, sort of. Kindly bear with me. It’s also a little about social constructionism, if that helps any.

Thus far we have seen that knowledge for the Sophists is invented individually and constructed socially, which makes it subjective and social. We have also seen that knowledge depends on perspective, interests, and language, which makes it relative. But if knowledge of any one thing depends on so many factors, there is no universal criterion of the truth. Consequently, knowledge is never stable or certain. P&P, 126

On the strength of these observations, the Sophists gave truth up as unattainable, and declared that the world of human affairs is driven and ruled by opinions, not knowledge. … [They] do not set out to portray opinion as a superior alternative to the truth. On the contrary, they uphold truth as a preferable, even if an impossible option.

Because opinions are tentative and provisional, those who hold them are necessarily ambivalent – they have not made their minds up once and for all. As such they are open to persuasion and have not ruled out the possibility of debate. Unlike knowledge, opinions cannot be true or false; they can only be shown to be stronger or weaker, popular or unpopular, appealing or repulsive …P&P 126 - 127

On the other hand, if we don’t protest and just blindly let Homeland Security-style maneuvers become normative, then we haven’t done our job as citizens. So once again, I must conclude that cynicism is impractical and counter-productive, as well as being most unattractive.

OK, all done with that now. And all done with this book, too. I’m not doing the section on Roman Rhetoric right now, because it doesn’t pertain to this project and I’ll be covering it next fall when I take Theory of Rhetoric. (I’ll probably be revisiting Plato’s theories about naming, though.) So next up is Small Pieces Loosely Joined, which is totally out of order, but I need to read it right quick for this other project that I might be doing. So I’m going to do that, and then pick back up with Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle.

Posted at 12:08 AM | Permalink | Comments (3)

"Plato asks three important questions. First, if convention and custom are not reliable in producing correct words and fitting names, how is one to rehabilitate language so as to reestablish its proper relationship to the things it names? Second, if most people cannot be trusted to make correct names, who is to decide this matter? Third, if most people cannot discern the appropriateness or correctness of names, who is to decide this matter?" P&P, 102

Professor: No. I think that you are right on track. The fact the all mortals are flawed means that we are all "disqualified" to a degree. That is what distinguishes mortals from gods. There is that "hidden" knowledge that mortals can not understand completely. ('God works in mysterious ways' is the out that many use to deal with this.)

But in the naming of things, some mortals are more qualified than others. Whoever has the power to name has the power to create. Religion has used this distinction of qualification in rhetoric in some cases, while philosophy has also said that the philosopher is closer to the divine truth that the rest of us. Does that make sense? In some ways it is about power. The person or persons/institutions that determine who is qualified really have the power to determine "reality."

Student: (to self) I can't turn loose of this yet. I think this is going to go on for a while.

Posted at 2:09 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tom Matrullo wrote the other day about broadcast media royalty as professional mourners:

I feel compelled to ask (because I see no one asking), what does it mean that it has apparently become accepted practice for broadcast media to do the work of mourning for us?…

Listening to NPR's Scott Simon, or watching hour after hour of televised shock and awe, one begins to wonder when and by what process these news anchors and commentators came to be appointed our official encomiasts, eulogists, undertakers, funeral-following marching band, interpreters of history and diviners of omens and portents.

So, I'm wondering, are news anchors the new Sophists? I see quite a few parallels. Anchors are the folks we can't stand because of the way they orate and influence. We worry about the persuasion involved, the blurring of right and wrong. We worry about the slant and the skew. The Greeks got all worked up about these traits, which they felt the Sophists' speeches displayed.

Like Tom said, anchors are our professional orators, there for every eulogy and encomium. Instead of standing on a box in a public space, they're in our houses, in their own little box.

And both were/are all about building a brand - every anchorman has his/her signature sign-off. (Although they all have the same hair.) Each Sophist collected his own student following by building a reputation. Remember this old commecial tagline? "More people get their news from ABC news than any other source." That was the ad that featured a slow pan across a sea of carefully-lit anchor faces, faces made so recognizable that they needed no nametags. And what are nightly-news watchers except students who show up regularly to be told what's what in the world?

Posted at 3:49 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)

Perception has been a hot topic in my world for the past couple of days. We're doing Human Factors in Theory of Tech Comm right now, and last night discussed perception as an element in communication failures. Most of the focus seemed to be on the mind's ability to see what isn't there - a problem we all run into in proofreading, for example.
I talked about it with a friend after class, and he was very adamant about his sense that what we were discussing wasn't perception, but rather cognition. As I understood his argument, perception is limited to the brain's reception of sensory input. Cognition involves how we interpret that input, which would result in our not being able to see typos.
The Cambridge Dictionary defines the terms as:

perception - an awareness of things through the physical senses, esp. sight
cognition - connected with thinking or conscious mental processes

It seems to me that what we're thinking about here falls in between the available language. If cognition is conscious, then misreading words doesn't fit there because we do that unconsciously. But it's more than just taking in information through physical senses too, because we're obviously doing something with the information on a subconscious level. (One would hope we're not consciously leaving those typos in there.) What we need is a new word: cogception. Or else someone who knows of a word for it should tell me about it.

Rambling my way through Chapter Four (Rhetoric and Language), I found that Gorgias and Protagoras were thinking about perception as well. According to P&P,

"For Gorgias and Protagoras, an object in itself and an object perceived are two different things. First, an object in itself is not subject to human perception and, as such, falls outside human awareness...

Continue reading "Perception (Chapter Four: Rhetoric and Language)" »

Posted at 7:18 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)

The things that fascinate me about this chapter are the parts pertaining to hyperbole. Maybe it's the Irish in me that's drawn to this sort of thing, and the English that counteracts it by striving for a more sober/accurate view of the world. (Not to imply that the British have a monopoly on reality. See Eddie Izzard's performances for further thoughts on this subject. Particularly "Cake or Death?," particularly on the logic of empire.)

On page 65, the Poulakoses examine "Excess and Exaggeration."

"Through hyperbolic language, epideictic rhetoric can make the customary appear exceptional and the ordinary extraordinary."

Maybe that's why Business Development fascinated me for those years. Competitive sales is a lot like the argument between Vice and Virtue in The Choice of Heracles. Justice and truth have nothing to do with it; what really matters is persuasion. Does anyone's choice of shipping carrier really make a difference? Sometimes, if the bid is right, there is an economic reason. But more often than not, it comes down to effective argument. It becomes a game, one that appealed to my love of language and sense of wickedness for a long time. Funny how easily that translates to scholarship in some cases.

Posted at 4:36 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Do any of my four lovely readers remember that profile I wrote on Roz Knutson about a year ago? (That would be the one I can't link to here because of the DOG's ridiculous web archive policy. Yep, there's so much revenue to be gained by charging $1.95 per article and irritating readers.) I knew that piece was an epideictic essay because Earnest told me so. I wrote it to fulfill that assignment in Persuasive Writing. And to make Frank Fellone happy. And because I might possibly have wanted to see my byline in the Sunday edition.

What I didn't know was that it was an almost purely Aristotelian encomium. Oh, yes! I can prove it, too, because it fulfills the following criteria:

Continue reading "So that's what it was!" »

Posted at 3:37 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

I haven't read any of the primary texts yet - that comes shortly. I've been using Classical Rhetorical Theory as an introductory overview before I head into Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle. The odd thing is that I'm starting to really like some of these guys more than others, and I feel a little ridiculous about that. Isn't that like liking someone because you read about them in People but never met them? At least I have some hope of formulating a reasonable opinion in the next few weeks.

At any rate: Isocrates and Aristotle are my men! Isocrates is so pragmatic, which appeals to me much more than Plato's flower-child idealism. "Knowledge of the Good" is crap, because it doesn't take into account the wormish parts of human nature, and Good is relative anyway. (Which Plato does acknowledge. But still.) "For Isocrates, the world is ruled by partial knowlege, limited options, and imperfect choices" (47). Precisely so, at least in my universe.

And Aristotle - practical wisdom and passion. It really doesn't get much better than that.

People who make every decision on the basis of antecedent rules, Aristotle remarks, are like architects who measure curves with straight rulers. ... The person of practical wisdom is prepared to meet the new with flexibility, with attention to its particularity and responsiveness to its uniqueness. (56)

Because deliberation is a function of one's character, and because character issues form a disposition toward appropriate emotional and intellectual responses to situations, judgment in deliberation issues both from the intellect and the emotions. For Aristotle, character combines intellect and passion in such a way that the intellect informs the passions and the passions drive the intellect. Accordingly, even if it were possible to eliminate the passions from deliberation, it would not be wise. (57)

...the person of practical wisdom relies on the power of the intellect as much as on the power of desire, and brings to the new situation both intellectual commitments and emotional attachments, calculation and passion alike. (58)

Posted at 2:35 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

This chapter looks at persuasion and deliberation in Classical Rhetoric. I am particularly taken with the principles of deliberative rhetoric detailed on page 36:

1. Deliberation provides responses to urgent situations. Knew that. (One would hope.)
2. Deliberation takes place at the limits of knowledge. I love this! How poetic and concise, all at the same time.
3. Deliberation aims at provisional consensus. Which doesn't always happen, but it's a nice idea.

#2 particularly does it for me, though. The authors explicate it in this fashion:

Deliberation begins with some form of doubt and uncertainty. It takes place because humans have only partial and incomplete knowledge. If they possessed perfect knowledge, there would be no need to deliberate - decisions would be self-evident or automatic, and the consequences of actions would be known in advance. Deliberation takes into account available knowledge, acknowledging all along the limits of what is known at the time.

Posted at 1:16 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

On page 40, the Poulakoses discuss the social aspects of deliberation:

When people deliberate, then, they do so in accordance with the laws of their city and the ethical norms of their community. When they articulate their interests, they speak not as individuals driven solely by their own personal desires, but as citizens concerned with the common good. If, during their deliberation, people speak as citizens, their speeches act as reminders that to deliberate means to uphold those virtues that hold the community together and strengthen its bonds.

In Theory of Tech Comm, we're just starting to discuss Social Constructivism. This is the rather clunky definition I wrote for class the other night:

Social construction theory, as interpreted by Bruffee, states that all knowledge is communal rather than individual. Knowledge is only created through social interaction. Therefore, language is integral to knowledge since it is the means through which knowledge is made. The creation of knowledge stimulates the creation of culture.

Deliberation, as Protagoras approaches it, is the creation of communal knowledge. The Deliberation of the Grecian political and legal arenas is the use of language to define the parameters of society. Cultures are known by their limits, by what the citizens deem acceptable. Which leads us into the Panopticon, because we become self-policing - the Culture is watching.

So was Protagoras the Social Constructionist Benthamite Foucauldian Sophist? (Reverse-engineered.) I'm all tangled up in theory, and I haven't read nearly enough.

Posted at 10:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Chapter one provides an overview of Rhetoric's intersection with Law in classical Greece.

The authors begin with the legend of Corax and Tisias and move from there into an explanation of the ways rhetoric was practiced in the Grecian legal system. Magistrates heard legal cases up until the fifth century BCE, when the jury system came into play. I was particularly interested in the size of the jury pools - 6,000 citizens in a pool and 501 jurors to a case, as opposed to today's 12 peers plus an alternate. They seem to have been just as litigious as us modern-day folk, though, and a citizen could sue anyone he chose to. This practice made rhetorical adeptness a virtue, as citizens needed to be able to convincingly defend themselves in the courts. And this, in turn, gave rise to a class of professional rhetoricians: teachers and logographers (speechwriters).

The professionals' observation of courtroom rhetoric lead to the formulation of three rhetorical principles discussed here: dissoi logoi (twofold arguments), to prepon (the appropriate), and kairos (the opportune moment.) These mean, respectively: that there are the proverbial two sides to every argument; that the most effective argument will be the one most appropriate for the situation and audience; and that the rhetorician must intuit the best time to speak.

The rest of the chapter is concerned with the pertinent Sophists: Gorgias, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. I'm not going to blog them in this entry since we'll be covering their works in detail in a few weeks. I'll try to do some sort of justice to each of them then.

Posted at 9:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"The main issues discussed in the assembly were war and peace. War was a constant condition for the Greek city-states, which fought one another to preserve or extend their borders, ravage each other's land, or teach each other a lesson. War generated the need for making alliances, while breaking an alliance served as cause for further war. While the Greeks looked to war as a way of settling their irreconcilable differences, they also celebrated their commonalities as Greeks in regularly held athletic and religious festivals. To participate in these events, the warring parties declared a period of truce, came together to celebrate the festivities, parted peacefully and, in due time, resumed hostilities. While the consequences of war varied widely, it was common for the victor to bring members of the conquered population home as slaves. Thus the issue of war was inseparable from issues of liberty and autonomy; what was often at stake in the Athenian assembly was nothing less than the possibility of the city's utter annihilation."

Poulakos/Poulakos, 35 - 36

Posted at 7:55 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

I'm usually not much for introduction chapters, but this one rocks. It opens with a persuasive bit regarding why classical rhetoric is necessary, and I especially like the definition of rhetoric that it puts forth: "As such, [rhetoric] has always concerned itself with the human capacities to reason, to create, to imagine, to move and be moved by means of language." What's important here is the fact that the authors include a human element, since so many definitions refer only to the language itself. And how can you have language without people? I mean, who makes the stuff?

On page x, they go on to state that one cannot fully understand contemporary rhetorical theory without understanding classical rhetorical theory:

"Rhetoric's present predicament, in and of itself, makes little or no sense; it is meaningless. Understanding it requires something else, something from which we can distinguish it or with which we can compare it. That 'something else' is afforded by rhetoric's past. However, rhetoric's past in itself, no matter how interesting, is ultimately useless. But when considered in the light of its present, rhetoric's past can help us understand why the present is the way it is."

From there, we take a quick look at the history of both Greco and Roman rhetoric. Both followed a primarily oral tradition, but the Greeks seem to have been more egalitarian. They expected citizens -- i.e. everyone -- to be able to defend themselves, and to engage in public oratory. In contrast, the Romans reserved this act for "people of priviledge and wealth" (xiii).

"Demands for rhetorical know-how were placed not on the ordinary citizen, but on the senator, the public administrator, the general, and the advocate."

I rather wish that a Certain Someone had required "The Significance of Theory" as reading in undergrad Rhetorical Theory. It's so simply laid out and beautifully done. It might have saved me a semester or so of confusion and rebellion. If nothing else, I wish I'd read it earlier today before I posted my "Where I Stand" essay for my expository students to read. I wrote about how theory (the bits of it I understand, anyway) brings a new clarity to my life. And here come Poulakos/Poulakos to tell me that "The term theory comes from the Greek word theoria, which means 'seeing,' 'viewing,' 'observing,' 'contemplating.' ... It offers a conceptual orientation by means of which people approach, and try to make sense out of, the contents of their experience" (xiv). I would have loved to have had that to throw in with everything else I was carrying on about.

Posted at 9:00 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

TO: Dr. Earnest Cox
DATE: January 8, 2003
RE: Spring Independent Study Proposal

As we discussed, I am interested in exploring the nexus between classical rhetoric and contemporary writing on the web, particularly among weblogging (“blogging”) communities. Symposium is essentially a massive conversation, much like those that take place among bloggers. I suspect there must be corollaries between these classical and modern conversations, despite the extreme variance of their mediums. In addition, the transition from oral to literate culture is fascinating in itself, and I wonder if blogging doesn’t create a new hybrid of these two – a “literate orality,” perhaps.

Continue reading "Proposal" »

Posted at 2:17 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

All right, enough playing around. This isn't a gorgeous page yet, but at least it's clean and functional now. And it's beautiful in it's simplicity, gosh-darn it! There's more to come, designwise, but it'll take a bit since I'm just learning how to code. That's one of the secondary goals of this project, as a matter of fact: to learn hard-core HTML. No generators, no Dreamweaver. Just code. Since I'm not really inclined toward this sort of thing, it seems to involve a lot of fiddling and cussing on my part, followed by phone calls to Patient and Knowledgeable Friends. It's just so much easier for me to sit around and contemplate the fact that HTML is language made visible than it is to Discipline Myself and Learn Code. But a girl's gotta do what a girl's gotta do. Especially when her grade depends on de-wussing herself.

So what is all of this? It's a blog with an intentionally limited audience. It's a Reading Journal for my spring Independent Study with Dr. Cox. It's an exercise in Something. The intentions are reasonably well laid out in my study proposal, which I shall post up forthwith.

Posted at 1:01 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)