Theory Archives

11.20.07

I can has grad students?

So I’m teaching a senior-level, writing intensive course on Emerging Technologies in Scientific and Technical Communication in the Spring. Registration opened last week, and it looks like it’s nearly made. And there are master's students from our MS program in it! (Masters students are allowed to take 4-credit 4000 level courses for 3 hours of grad credit. Of course, they do an extra project on top of the standard undergrad syllabus.) This should be even more fun than I had expected.

I had already expected it to be a pretty interesting time. Here’s the course blurb:

This 4-credit, writing intensive survey course explores the impact of Web 2.0 applications in scientific and technical communication. In this web-based class, we’ll work together to create an extensive informational site on scientific, technical, and social aspects of the 35W bridge collapse. Our project will use wikis, podcasts, tagging, Google Docs, Flickr, Picasa, Moodle, Basecamp and other content generation and management applications. We’ll also use blogs, IM, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Jaiku during the collaborative process.

Participants will gain a broad vocabulary and understanding of relevant theories as well as a sense of how different workplace environments are coping with the challenges of sci/tech communication in a period of complex factors, multiple audiences, geographical distances, and fast-changing tools.

I’m still sending the flyer around, though, since things will work out even better if the course picks up a few Econ, Civil Engineering, and Environmental Science majors. (Click to download PDF.)

The image is a minor remix of this HDR photo of 35W by gbenz, who runs the local photoblog View From the Tundra. Thanks for being so awesome about the CC licenses, man. The flyer is licensed in kind.

04.30.06

FAQ

Bruno Latour has the best set of FAQs I’ve ever seen on an academic home page. You really should go look — it’s the last item on the sidebar, assuming you prefer to read in English.

10.27.04

Jon Stewart and Habermas

Everybody on the Internets has read/seen/heard Jon Stewart's arguments about the need for honest debate on Crossfire last week. It's possibly not so well known, however, that he was restating Habermas:

�By entering into a process of moral argumentation, the participants continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude with the aim of restoring a consensus that has been disrupted. Moral argumentation thus serves to settle conflicts of action by consensual means. Conflicts in the domain of norm-guided interactions can be traced directly to some disruption of a normative consensus. Repairing a disrupted consensus can mean one of two things: restoring intersubjective recognition of a validity claim after it has become controversial or assuring intersubjective recognition for a new validity claim that is a substitute for the old one. Agreement of this kind expresses a common will. If moral argumentation is to produce this kind of agreement, however, it is not enough for the individual to reflect on whether he can assent to a norm. It is not even enough for each individual to reflect in this way and then to register his vote. What is needed is a �real� process of argumentation in which the individuals concerned cooperate. Only an intersubjective process of reaching understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive in nature; only it can give the participants the knowledge that they have collectively become convinced of something.

"Discourse Ethics," Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 67

Habermas resources

Comprehensive:
Wikipedia entry on Habermas
Habermas Online (USC) (constantly updated, includes video)
The Jurgen Habermas Resource (MSU)
Habermas Portal (Oxford/Stanford/Yale)

Discourse Ethics:
Introduction to Habermas' Discourse Ethics (Carnegie Mellon)

Internet:
The Internet and the Theories of Habermas (Case-Western)
Towards a Synthesis of Discourse Ethics and Internet Regulation (Middlesex University)

10.24.04

theory, poetry, and spirit

A couple of years ago, I was reading Irigaray and Barthes and a bunch of feminist texts for a course in Queer Theory. That was also the semester I read Archaeology of Knowledge, which was not the best text to pick as an introduction to Foucault. Foucault has moments of beauty in his writing, but he rarely achieves the level of poetry that Barthes and Irigaray often manage. I was thinking a lot about the differences in their styles, wondering if poetry and theory can or should share the same space. It seemed to me that texts were more effective when both elements were present. Somewhere toward the end of that semester, I ran across this:

But what about the 'conflict' between poetry and theory, between their separate and seemingly incompatible spheres? We have been told that poetry expresses what we feel, and theory states what we know; that the poet creates out of the heat of the moment, while the theorist's mode is, of necessity, cool and reasoned; that one is art and therefore experienced "subjectively," and the other is scholarship, held accountable in the "objective" world of ideas. We have been told that poetry has a soul and theory has a mind and that we have to choose between them.
The white western patriarchal ordering of things requires that we believe there is an inherent conflict between what we feel and what we think - between poetry and theory. We are easier to control when one part of our selves is split from another, fragmented, off balance. There are other configurations, however, other ways of experiencing the world, though they are often difficult to name. We can sense them and seek their articulation.

Nancy K. Bereano, Introduction to "Sister Outsider" by Audre Lorde

So I copied it down in an email that I sent to my professor (who has since become a very good friend) and Mister Boyfriend (who was not then occupying the space of Boyfriend). Mister Boyfriend, as a Blakean and Romanticist, replied with a strong arguement for poetry, which goes a long way toward explaining why he quickly became much dearer to me. My professor, a former-poet-turned-tech-writer, surprised us (and herself) with the vehemance of her disagreement. She contended that poetry had no place in theory, that she found it aggravating and frivolous to find bits of fluff in an otherwise dense text. At the time, I thought that was very sad. What is life without poetry?
So now I'm reading Buber, who is also heavy on the poetic. Reading him is a very slow process for me, especially since we're trying to apply his work to Rhetoric. Mister Boyfriend is also in the Ethics course that Buber is assigned for, and he came into my study one night last week and reminded me of that old conversation about theory and poetry. We talked about it awhile, and were sort of appalled that we found Buber's poetic elements extremely distracting. But now I wonder - is it the poetic that I find distracting, or the spiritual? Have I become so accustomed to concentrating on theoretical text and discourse that I'm annoyed by any inclusion of spirituality or mysticism in considerations of them?
I think Buber, had he been more interested in the study of rhetoric, would have argued that the ideal text or discourse can't not involve poetry or spirituality. In Dialogue, he writes that God is in the space between two people, in the open exchange of idea and heart. God exists in the liminality created by true engagement. And what else do text and discourse really aspire to on their best days? Nothing less.

10.13.04

some Kant for Mom

Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which presents a sensible illusion artificially combined with ideas, I would divide into the art of the beautiful depicting of nature and that of the beautiful arrangement of its products. This first is painting proper, the second is the art of landscape gardening. The first gives only the illusory appearance of corporeal extension; the second gives this in accordance with truth, but only the appearance of utility and availableness for other purposes than the merely play of the imagination in the contemplation of its forms. This latter is nothing else than the ornamentation of the soil with a variety of those things (grasses, flowers, shrubs, trees, even ponds, hillocks, and dells) which nature presents to an observer, only arranged differently and in conformity with certain ideas.

Continue reading "some Kant for Mom" »

10.05.04

Does feminist research perpetuate patriarchal relationships?

One of the weekly assignments for my Research Methods course is to bring at least one discussion question to class. The structure of the class is very cool: instead of one professor lecturing all semester, we have a different "expert" faculty member come in every week to talk about their specific area of research. It is truly a survey (which I haven't really had the opportunity to get before) and the lecturers have all spent a number of years researching and publishing in their area, so they really know what they're talking about. And you get to give your research question to someone who's rather eminent in the field and get an answer back from them.

Anyway. Last week was Historical Research, and this week is Feminist Research. I consider myself both a feminist and a researcher, but not necessarily a Feminist Researcher, although I do think aspects of the field are both applicable and valuable to my work. One of the readings for last week had to do with "decolonizing" our research subjects/participants, which I did quite a bit of arguing with privately. I think the concept certainly comes from a well-meant place, but any true application is impossible. (Your mileage may vary.) This informs my question for this week. I'm asking this not because I want to be combative, but because I'm really trying to figure it out:

In light of last week’s discussion about decolonizing our subjects, I wonder now about the ethics of researching participants whose experiences we ourselves are necessarily excluded from. Obviously such lack of commensurate experience does not affect the quality of scholarship (I’m thinking here of Cushman’s “The Struggle and The Tools.”) However, I can’t help but wonder about the ethics involved.

Since we’re reading studies of the rhetoric surrounding maternity this week, I’ll draw on that. Suppose the female researcher examining rhetorics of maternity is childless. (I'm not even going to touch on the issues of male researchers here.) That researcher obviously shares experiences of aspects of “womanhood” with her participants. However, she does not share a personal understanding of the experience at the focus of the study, maternity. Can she ever, then, construct her participants as anything other than The Other? And if she further embraces the advocacy stance that Lay notes as characteristic of feminist research and applies to her participants the subjectivity of “one who needs help/advocacy," isn’t she setting up an oddly paternalistic relationship: researcher as Advocate of the Misunderstood, Oppressed Other? Researcher as Savior, of sorts? Doesn’t this replicate the patriarchal power structure that feminist research struggles against? Was Foucault right, and all resistance eventually replicates that which it struggles against?

On the other hand, it’s positively silly to expect the researcher to research only those things that she already has experience of. If we only study that which we already know, then what have we gained? Why not just sit around and write autobiographies all day? (Not that there's anything wrong with autobiographies.) Why not just affirm and re-affirm what we each already know and occasionally ask others for supporting views? Heck, except for T&P requirements, why not just sit around on the porch and make the young'uns listen to our stories/theories/whatevers?

So you see my dilemma. Surely, I think, the ethical answer lies somewhere in the middle. I'm just not sure what that answer will be.

I have no idea what Eminent Feminist Researcher's response will be to this question. But I am curious as to what your thoughts are.

09.08.04

No Moral High Ground

The big quote below the citation is from a handout my Ethics professor passed out tonight. It's pertinent to a lot of things, not the least of which is this interminable political season. Remember, though:

Do not however suppose that the conclusion to be drawn will turn out to be one of despair. Angst is an intermittently fashionable emotion and the misreading of some existentialist texts has turned despair itself into a kind of psychological nostrum. But if we are indeed in as bad a state as I take us to be, pessimism too will turn out to be one more cultural luxury that we shall have to dispense with in order to survive in these hard times. (MacIntyre, 5)


Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (Notre Dame UP, 1981). pp 6 - 7.

“The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable character. I do not mean by this that such debates go on and on – although they do – but also that they apparently can find no terminus. There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture.”

Continue reading "No Moral High Ground" »

06.03.04

copyfighter? me?

Clancy and Charlie began a discussion today about copyfighters who still use proprietary applications, particularly closed-source blogware. I'll agree that practicing what one preaches is definitely a good thing. I'll argue that one should definitely strive for integrity as much as possible. I'll even mention that I'm flattered that my blog hit their radar.

But here's the thing: I'm not a copyfighter. I am an intellectual property scholar, and there's a difference between those two things.

I am interested in the ways textual authorship functions in digital spaces, particuarly in spaces that might be considered a digital commons. My current project examines blogs (and to some extent wikis) as sites of the digital commons, and I do suggest that the text contained in those environments can be considered part of an intellectual commons. My blog has a Creative Commons license because I do indeed wish to practice what I preach regarding text.

However, I don't examine open-source philosophy or sites in my current work. I do not argue for the abolition of copyright, nor do I advocate copyleft or GPL, nor to I support rampant proliferation of Creative Commons licenses*. What I do is examine the theory and history of the intellectual commons and the author construct and then apply that research to digital environments. Here's an excerpt from the introduction to my thesis:

There is also a need for inquiry into the underlying principles of the intellectual and digital commons, particularly those principles that affect textual and rhetorical scholarship. My goal in writing this thesis is to work toward a theoretical underpinning for the digital commons, not to crusade for it. This project aspires to explore a small area of this large discussion: A contemplation of the origin and conditions of the digital commons. While I do suggest that current copyright law is not applicable to digital authorship, I do not argue for the abolition of copyright. Rather, I believe that copyright and the commons both have appropriate applications and can coexist in the world. As Lessig suggests, there are private drives and public parks, and both serve a place in society.

Studying something is not equivalent to campaigning for it. Scientists who study bacteria aren't pro-bacteria and anti-virus. They just study bacteria. I study intellectual property and copyright.

This discussion (and the labeling that goes with it) is very similar to the one I was involved in last summer about my study of Foucault, which led certain bloggers to label me a Postmodernist. (You can read my response to that here. If you want to know about the whole thing, search my blog for "Foucault" or "Postmodernism" and read the posts that are dated last summer.) My work does currently rely heavily on Foucault, Barthes, and Deleuze and Guattari. (Never mind that half those folks didn't consider themselves Pomo). As I said in that post, what we do here is a job. These are for me, at this moment, the best tools for the job at hand. I'm not rejecting other schools of thought, and I wouldn't hesitate to use a Modernist or Structuralist theorist if their work helped me ground mine. My use of Postmodern theory does not make me a Postmodernist. Similarly, my study of copyright alternatives does not make me a copyfighter.

And that brings me to a final thought: the tools for the job of blogging. I am a rhetorician, not a software engineer. I'm not interested in playing with different applications for the heck of it if the one I'm using does what I want it to do. For a long time, MT did everything I needed. Now, my needs have changed and it doesn't fulfill them- specifically, it doesn't handle comments and pre-set posting times sufficiently. I'm shopping for another blogware, but it's because I need the right tool for the job, not because I'm concerned with whether or not it's open-source or if Six Apart charges for their application. (Frankly, if MT did what I wanted it to do, I'd pay a reasonable fee for it.) I'm leaning toward Wordpress because my sysadmin is leaning toward Wordpress. (If Textpattern supported trackback, I'd actually be more inclined to use it instead.)

So there you go. I'm flattered to be considered a copyfighter, and that label would certainly put me in very good company with some smart folks. However, I'm a participant and watcher in the discussion, not an advocate. I walk my talk as well as I can, but right now, my talk only extends so far.

*Update: I should add that I'm not necessarily against GPL or copyleft. It's just that my current project doesn't entail a position on them.

05.05.04

CCCC Panel Proposal

(As seen on KairosNews and Open Access News.) Here's the panel proposal that several of us intrepid IP folks put together:

With the verdict in the Eldred v. Ashcroft case and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the last decade has seen a steady dwindling of the intellectual and creative works in the public commons. This panel will demonstrate the significance of the current intellectual property climate as it intersects with authorship, technology, the fiction of scarcity, and the collaborative model of open source software. The presenters argue that collaborative authorship and open access to information and creative works portend thriving knowledge formation in composition pedagogy and scholarship.

Continue reading "CCCC Panel Proposal" »

03.04.04

dear everybody,

Thanks to everyone who has responded (or plans on responding) to my search for blog posts that demonstrate writing as a healing process, and those who have publicized my project on their own blogs. I am currently traveling and have limited computer access, so please don't be offended if you haven't gotten a response from me yet. I appreciate the offer of your texts, and will respond to all emails and comments by the end of next week.

02.28.04

blogs as sites of healing

I'm taking a course in Theory of Writing and Healing this semester. One of the things we've looked at this semester is the role of community in facilitating healing. I would like to focus my first paper on blogs as sites of writing, healing, and community. In order to do this, I (obviously) need to reference some specific blogs and their pertinent posts.

Blogs, by virtue of their nature, are public documents. However, the personal nature of the posts I want to look at in this project make me feel like I'm headed into human-subjects territory, even though it's not strictly considered as such. I don't want bloggers who have written about traumatic personal events to feel invaded by a study about such personal posts. I'm not sure how I myself would feel about such a thing if the subject were my writing. I might be offended by the notion that my pain was a subject for study. Or I might be thrilled that my posts could facilitate a better understanding of the healing process brought about by the act of writing in a public environment.

There are a couple of bloggers on my blogroll who have written extensively about personal traumatic events. I've thought about contacting them and asking them if they would mind being subjects for my paper, but I'm hesitant to do so. Therefore, I've decided to ask for volunteers in this manner. If you have written multiple blog posts about a personal traumatic event and would not mind them being included in my paper, please drop me a line in my comments or via email. I am particularly interested in the ways that bloggers have written about serious illness and the deaths of family members, but writing about other instances of trauma is also welcome. The deadline for me to find suitable texts for study is March 6, one week from today.

02.08.04

non-neutral

I got into a discussion about subjectivity with some other students in a chat room this afternoon. In an attempt to explain/explore the concept, I said, "Society might assign me the labels of woman, deaf, student, and straight." Someone else responded, "But aren't these more neutral labels?"

And I thought, "Well, maybe they are." But the more I think about it, the more I think every one of those labels is non-neutral, especially the last three. "Deaf" immediately labels me as disabled, and I rarely feel disabled. Occasionally it comes into play (I definitely say "huh?" a lot), but I've been brought up to reject the imposed subjectivity of "disabled person." I embrace the label of "student," but most of the world wants to know why I'm still in school at my age. And "straight" is a problem because that label doesn't exactly fit, either. "Woman" is even problematic from an extremely postmodern perspective, and I would definitely argue that it's a politically loaded term.

Come to think of it, they all are. I'm not sure there is such a thing as a neutral label.

01.28.04

fair and balanced

Judith Butler has a new book coming out in April, and she's finally been the subject of Routledge Critical Thinkers edition. And this article (via Arts and Letters Daily) tears her a new one for Gender Trouble.

I have a strange affection for Butler: she was the first truly difficult theorist I ever read, and I met my honey over Gender Trouble. How many folks in straight relationships can say that? (And would anyone in their right mind want to?)

brain hemisphericity and image

I’m taking a course in Theory of Writing and Healing this semester from this guy, who edited this collection. His co-author, Marian MacCurdy, has an article in it entitled “From Trauma to Writing: A Theoretical Model for Practical Use,” and in part of it she looks at current research regarding brain hemisphericity and image. One study at Cornell asked severe epileptics to look at a split computer screen. One side of the screen would show a word, and the other an image that didn’t match the word. The subject would then be asked to look at the left side of the screen and describe what s/he saw. It turned out that the right side of the brain (which saw the words) could not decode it verbally and the left side (which saw the image) could not relate the image to the word. The subjects would then (unbidden) instinctually create a narrative in an attempt to make sense of the images that their brains could not process. (For a better explanation, see page 181 of the book, OK?)

Where all this is headed is a discussion of the Freudian notion of the unconscious, and that’s what I’m interested in:

Gazzaniga and LeDoux interpret these results to mean that the primary task of the verbal self is to construct a reality based on behavior. They believe that our verbal selves are not always aware of the origin of our actions and therefore cannot be depended upon to interpret those actions correctly. As quoted in Springer and Deutsch: “It is as if the verbal self looks out and sees what the person is doing and from that knowledge it interprets a reality” (264). In this context the verbal self assumes information it cannot actually have, producing an inaccurate narrative.

Work with split-brain patients may indeed offer insights into clinical psychology as well. David Galin believes that split brain research can validate Freud’s theory of an unconscious. Galin argues that normally the right and left hemispheres function together, but under certain conditions they can be opaque to each other. As a result, a situation resembling split brain can occur: “Imagine the effect on a child when his mother presents on message verbally, but quite another with her facial expression and body language; ‘I am doing it because I love you, dear’ say the words, but ‘I hate you and will destroy you,’ says the face” (Springer and Deutsch 261). If this occurs, the two hemispheres may be in conflict, in which case the left may try to prevent communication from the right side. During these moments, the left dominates completely, while the right goes underground, functioning as a Freudian unconscious, “an independent reservoir of inaccessible cognition” (262) which can create emotional turmoil. Both the Gazzaniga and LeDoux and the Galin studies indicate that necessary information may not always be accessible to the conscious mind, research findings which may have consequences for writers, particularly those investigating emotionally charged images and topics.

MacCurdy, Marian. "From Trauma to Writing: A Theoretical Model for Practical Use."
Writing and Healing: Toward an Informed Practice.
ed. Charles Anderson and Marian MacCurdy.
Urbana: NCTE, 2000. 181 - 182.

09.28.03

Zittrain: The Copyright Cage

(more thesis research links)

The Copyright Cage by Jonathan Zittrain, in Darwin Magazine.

I found this on some fabulous person's blog a few days ago and printed it off to read. Now I can't remember who it was that linked it. So thank you, whoever you are.

Zittrain mentions that sound recordings weren't covered under copyright until 1971, which absolutely astounds me. There's lots more valuable stuff besides (which is highlighted on my print copy.) Also, the previous links came from this article.

06.13.03

possibly PoMo

It's interesting, this business of being categorized as a Postmodernist. I've never really thought of myself as one, but I guess that if we throw it against the wall it'll stick. Essentially, though, I'm a student. I got curious and looked that word up, and it comes from the Latin studens, which is related to studere, to study. Therefore, that would be my job: to study. (I knew that already.) When one studies, one needs tools to understand things with. This is what theory does for me - it provides tools to take things apart.

All I care is that the tool works. I don't care if it's fashionable, just that it's functional. If plain old Structuralism worked for me, then I'd use it. The more I study Postmodernism, the more I see how I can apply to it to the world at large. More and more, I find that it works for me now, at this place and this time. Of course it has flaws, as everything man-made does. When it doesn't hold up, it's time to reach for a different tool in the toolbox. There's no point in using a hammer when what's really needed is a drill. Still, PoMo theory works for me far more often than it doesn't - and certainly more often than anything else does. (Your mileage may vary.)

The other reason I study Postmodernism is that there are things that a successful graduate student is expected to know - in this case, the dominant theories of the field. It's the rules. Besides, one needs to know the lay of the land in order to successfully navigate it. I didn't suggest a Foucault seminar because I'm working for the canonization of Saint Foucault*. I wanted to take a course in this stuff because I need to know about it. It's a requirement of the profession. My thesis has to do with Intellectual Property, and there's no way that any department would let me defend a thesis on that topic that didn't discuss Foucauldian power issues. There are some things that are simply expected, and thusly must be done.

So yeah, I guess I'm PoMo, although never in the most conventional sense of the term. (Stereotypical views of Postmodernism abound. And some of them are funny.) I have no patience for the bleakness of Sartre. I'm not an atheist or an agnostic. I can't help but believe that there has to be a center somewhere, and that it does hold. But bleakness isn't the essence of Postmodernism for me, not by a long shot. What Postmodernism does for me is provide a reminder that we can never stop questioning, that we can't accept things at face value. That seems like quite a worthwhile thing, given the line of work I'm in.


* Actually, what I asked for was a sixteen-week course in the Structuralist Gang of Four, which would have covered Barthes, Lacan, Foucault and Levi-Strauss**. What I got was five weeks of Foucault, and I'm happy to have it.
** Yes, I know that Foucault railed against being categorized as a Structuralist. And in many ways, he was right to do so. But that's not the issue here.

05.30.03

Proper Foucault for Dummies

We started the Foucault Reading Seminar last Wednesday. I'm looking forward to it, and not just because I was the one who suggested the class way back last fall. At the time, I was interested in Foucault's relation to Queer Theory, but my interests have changed over the last few months. Now I've moved on to Foucault and Intellectual Property, since it ties into my thesis topic. The professor is the same one who taught Queer Theory, and she has the best, most basic approach to reading seminars: she just shows up and asks everyone what they want to read, and then wades in along with the rest of us. I'm definitely not fearless enough to teach that way, but she pulls it off. I've rarely been more engaged than I was with the work we did in Queer Theory, and it was largely because I felt directly invested in the class.

The Foucault class is pretty evenly split by extremes: half hard-core grad students who have already read some Foucault and are working on theses, and half undergrads who aren't completely sure who Foucault was. So we spent the first class covering basic intro stuff and recommending background readings.

I had already read Introducing Foucault a while back, when I was first reading Archaeology of Knowledge. (I wouldn't recommend that anyone in the world pick that as their first exposure to Foucault.) Even though I've read more Foucault since then, I went ahead and picked up Foucault for Beginners since that seemed to be what everyone else in the class was reading in preparation. (It's published by Writers and Readers, whose catalogue also includes the always-amusing Domestic Violence for Beginners.)

The world needs a good Foucault for Dummies book, but Foucault for Beginners ain't it. First off, it's overly simplistic - Fillingham claims that Foucault can be reduced to the aphorism "Knowledge is Power." I'm certainly not a Foucault expert, but it seems to me that if you wanted to boil the man's work down to three words, they would have to be "Power Impacts Knowledge." Even that doesn't really do it. Perhaps it's just best to stay away from such reductive statements altogether. Plus, I always get irritated by "overviews" that include traces of the author's agenda, which in this case clearly originates in Women's Studies. She snarks about Foucault's tendency to ignore women in a number of places. And it's true, he does ignore them, but I didn't notice any snarkery about Sartre's misogyny in her passages that lionized him. Unfortunately, the rest of the book is just as reductive and slanted.

The thing that most irritated me was her treatment of Foucault's relationship to and works on sexuality. She asserts that Foucault's work is all about abnormality: "Madness, Criminality and Perverted Sexuality." Fair enough, but the term "perverted," with its connotations of inherent judgement, got my hackles up right off the bat. Although Foucault's sexuality is occasionally mentioned throughout the book, it's largely glossed over. There's no discussion in the biographical section of the fact that growing up queer in Catholic France (and its attendant notions of psychological propriety) might have fostered his interests in language, power, and madness. There's no discussion of his relationship with Roland Barthes, although Daniel Defert, his more commonly recognized lover, is mentioned. Only the briefest mention is made of how Foucault's philosophy was played out through his involvement with S/M. All three volumes of History of Sexuality receive only 15 pages of consideration, while the other major works receive around 30 pages apiece. And Herculine, his "recovered memoirs of a 19th century hermaphrodite," is completely missing both from the text and from the list of Foucault's additional works. I, Paul Riviere... is mentioned in both, and it's just as minor a work as Herculine.

One would think that Gender Studies and Queer Theory folks would look out for each other, but that's rarely the case. It's certainly evident in Foucault for Beginners. So if you're looking for a competent general introduction to Foucault (with pictures!), I suggest you check out Introducing Foucault instead. It's much better, as it adheres to the standards of the "Introducing" series. I haven't been disappointed by any of their books yet.

04.13.03

postmodern ethics

We were trying to explain the general concept of postmodernism to a classmate the other day. (The impetus for this discussion was our study of postmodern ethics in Theory of Technical Communication. Most of the students in this class are hard-core tech writers, not Theory Heads. Not that a person can't be both, but it doesn't seem to be the case with this group.)
Things started off like this:
"Is it an era?"
"No, it's more a school of thought."
"But this is the Modern Age."
"No, it's not. That was from around 1890 to around 1955, give or take, depending on who you talk to."
"Well, so what does this school of thought say?"
"Well, to be simplistic, it says that Truth is relative."
"But there has to be Truth!"
A bunch of master's-level students trying to define postmodernism? You know you're headed down a long, long road.*

I've been thinking about this for the past few days, though. How would one teach the concept of postmodern ethics to a group of people who just aren't that interested in Theory? Assuming a 16-week semester and a grad-level seminar devoted to the subject, I've decided I would start with L. Frank Baum's The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, followed by Geoffrey Maguire's Wicked: The Life and Times of the Wicked Witch of the West. This would take up the first week and a half or so. Everyone should read the original text of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, because it is completely different from the movie and, to my mind, much better. It's a supremely odd little tale with murder and mayhem and general evility every few pages. (Plus, it provides an excellent opportunity to discuss the ethics of Hollywoodization and, later on, Creative Commons.)

Wicked is a longer read, but not at all difficult. It's the tale told from the perspective of the Wicked Witch, beginning with her auspicious birth as a little green-skinned girl named Elphaba. Over the course of 400 pages, Maguire develops a psychological case study of her, establishing motives and ethics. (The Wicked Witch is a political dissident! Who knew? This is part of how she ends up in that remote castle.) Eventually, the reader comes to understand Dorothy as a spoiled interloper who has total disregard for the consequences of her actions. The Witch completely gets the raw end of the deal:

And of the Witch? In the life of a Witch, there is no after, in the ever after of a Witch, there is no happily; in the story of a Witch, there is no afterword. Of that part that is beyond the life story, beyond the story of the life, there is - alas, or perhaps thank mercy - no telling. She was dead, dead and gone, and all that was left of her was the carapace of her reputation for malice.

By the time one comes to the end of this, one understands that Evil can be relative. So, correspondingly, is Good. And from there, it is not difficult to understand that Truth is also relative. Once you've got that, then a larger discussion of postmodern ethics is easily feasible. You can move on to reading the Canon and whatever else you want to talk about - tech comm, Creative Commons, politics, witches, socioeconomics. Anything at all is fair game.

*That might sound unnecessarily snotty. Don't get me wrong - I myself am working on my MFA. And I probably couldn't give you a good, concise definition of postmodernism to save my ass.

04.12.03

the electronic word

I've gotten to the part of The Paper where I talk about Lanham's The Electronic Word. Here's what I've got so far:

Is text always text, in the same manner that a rose is a rose is a rose? Print text remains static on the page. Electronic text not only enables but encourages interaction, as the reader/author can easily cut, paste, change fonts - and completely alter or delete text. Print text takes time and money to produce. Electronic text requires only time - anyone with enough time and access to a computer can crank it out. It is easily copied and distributed at the click of a mouse. Print text takes time, money and space to store. Electronic text is easily indexed. Entire encyclopedias reside on compact disks, which take up hardly any room at all.

In The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts, Lanham debates these issues and the implications they pose for traditional copyright law. Copyright law was developed to address the needs of printed media - solid matter that we can hold in our hands. "Intellectual property in words may never have been rooted in a substance, an essence, but we could fool ourselves most of the time that it was," Lanham notes (19). The internet may have space, but it does not have substance - and neither does pixilated print.

Traditional copyright law provides protection from derivative works. Lanham views electronic text as potential incarnate (19). How, then, are we to protect the potential of a text? Should we even try to do so? And regardless of effort expended, is such a thing even feasible? It seems that an attempt to do so would be an attempt to assert ourselves as small gods - to claim to own the future. Yet, traditional copyright law attempts to do just this by providing protection from derivative works. These protections, which had their origins in the Statute of Anne and the Sayre Case of 1785, were constructed for a world that honored only print text (Lanham 134). They were constructed to protect the Great Works, sacred unto themselves. They were not built for a world that considers Duchamp's mustachioed Mona Lisa to be art, and certainly not for a world that might celebrate the textual equivalent. As Lanham notes, "Electronic text and copyright law are steering a collision course at almost every point" (134).

04.03.03

rhizomatic

Both of my final projects this semester are about intellectual property on the web. One deals with the TEACH Act and the other with Creative Commons. Right now I'm working on constructing a theoretical background that will work for both of them.

I'm starting by playing around with Deleuze and Guattari's Introduction: Rhizome. It's still in the very early stages, but I'd be interested in any comments you guys might have. This is written for a non-blogging audience, so it contains a lot of things my readers here already know. On the other hand, you'll know if I've gotten them wrong, which is helpful. And if you see yourself mentioned here and would rather not be, then let me know and I'll delete the reference.

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03.19.03

never say never

I'm not usually an Elbow-ite, but I love this bit, which comes from Embracing Contraries in the Teaching Process.

Good learning is not a matter of finding a happy medium where both parties are transformed as little as possible. Rather both parties must be maximally transformed - in a sense deformed. ... We can not learn something without eating it, yet we can not really learn it either without letting it eat us.

03.06.03

half a post is better than no post at all

I've had these quotes sitting around for several days now, and been convinced that I was going to turn them into a nice tidy post. It's finally dawned on me that it's not going to happen, since I'm snowed under with projects at the moment and have no hope of relief in the next week and a half. So I'm posting these puppies up anyway in the interest of preservation and filing them in the "Meta-blogging" category. I'm sure most of you will see why they belong there.

All of this is from Bruffee's "Collaborative Learning and the 'Conversation of Mankind," which is in my "Cross-talk in Comp Theory" text.

"We are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves. … Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance."

Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, quoted by Bruffee


"The range, complexity, and subtlety of our thought, its power, the practical and conceptual uses we can put it to, and the very issues we can address result in large measure directly from the degree to which we have been initiated into what Oakeshott calls the potential “skill and partnership” of human conversation in its public and social form" (Bruffee, 399)

"The first steps to learning to think better, therefore, are learning to converse better and learning to establish and maintain the sorts of social context, the sorts of community life, that foster the sorts of conversation members of the community value" (399).

03.03.03

Introduction: D&G

Been reading Deleuze and Guattari’s Introduction: Rhizome lately. If one is studying digital discourse, then one must read it. Them’s the rules. So I did, and now I’m thinking. Maybe I’ll manage to find enough time to blog it in the next couple of days. But right now, I want to foist the introductory paragraph of that essay upon my non-theory readers, the ones who think this stuff isn’t any fun at all. Reading this is like being a fly on the wall, watching a couple of guys tossing words back and forth and generally enjoying themselves. (And since I’ve been knee-deep in collaborative theory lately, it adds a nice levity to that train of thought as well.)

“The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. Here we have made use of everything that came within range, what was closest as well as farthest away. We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and think. Also because it’s nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it’s only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point, where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.”

Here are some D&G links, most, if not all, of which are via Wood s Lot. (Does anyone else around here feel that Woods reads their minds, or at least anticipates their every need? That aside, the man just runs a damn fine blog.)

Rhizome@Internet: Using the Internet as an Example of Deleuze and Guattari's "Rhizome"
Deleuze & Guattari Online Resources
Rhizome: About Deleuze & Guattari and Their Trees and Rhizomes

02.20.03

poindexter

Last night, we were discussing the hotness of theory. I’m amazed at how many people don’t agree with me on this. (Aside from my usual amazement that people disagree with me, that is.) I know all the “why do you need to know this stuff” folks don’t see it, but neither do many of my fellow students. They’re totally missing out. Granted, some theory is boring, but there’s a lot that’s just plain lascivious. Obviously they haven’t read Barthes, who first comes to mind for me:

“Language is a skin: I rub my language against the other. It is as if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tips of my words. My language trembles with desire. The emotion derives from a double contact: on the one hand, a whole activity of discourse discreetly, indirectly focuses upon a single signified, which is 'I desire you,' and releases, nourishes, and ramifies it to the point of explosion...”

A Lover’s Discourse

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